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Hany comp Lafn t.hr.t the words of the wise are always merely parables
and of no use in daily life, which is the only life we have.
tVhen the sage says: "Co over, H he does not mean that we should
cross to some actual place, whf.ch we could do anyhow if the labor
were worth it; he ocans some fabulous yonder, something unknown
to us, something too that he cannot designate more precisely,
and therefore cannot help us here in the very least. All these
parables really set out to say merely that the incomprehensible
is incomprehensible, end we know that already. But the cares we
have to struggle with every day: t hat is a df.f fe rent matter.
Concerning rhf,s a mall once said: Why such reluctance?
If you only fo Ll.owed the parables you yourseLves would become
pnrables and with that rid of all your daily cares.
Another said: I bet that is also a parable.
TI1e first said: You have won.
The second said: But unfortunately only in parable.
TIle firs~ said: No, in reality: in parable you have lost.
Franz Kafka
"On Parables"
Introduction
The prima~y focal point of this paper is an investigation into the
significance, if any , of the idea of conflict in two "c.lass t cal," sociologists--
Emile DurkheIm (1958-1917) and IIa:,: t~eber (1964-1920). Although both developed 1
sociolc37 par excellence in thei~ respective countries and were contemporaneous,
neither seemed conscious of the other--they worked separately.
The analysis of conflict comprises an exercise in comparative theoretical
annlysis. The first problem, then, wi~l be to present a framework for comparing
DurkheLm and t·Jcbcr. After s. brief comment on the " times it in which they wrote,
we move to an ex~~nation of conflict in first Durkheim End then Weber. The
peper will end with a compa=ison and conclusion.
I. A Fral:le\vorl< for COTI":.parDtive Study of Sociological Theory
TIle solution to this t ask is "zeLat LveLy" simple in that all one needs to
know is (1) what are the ess~ntial parts of a theory, (2) fill in the empty
cells of these eLerient s of a theory for any given theorist, and (3) compare the
respective results for two (or more) theorists. In addition to setting forth
a framework for theory construction, a further requisite exists; namely, the
analysis of a concept, since that is the purpose of this paper. Thus conflict
has 0'10 possible "mean tngs " in t hf.s paper : (1) as an element in a theoretical
framework and/or (2) as a concept (the latter will become more clear below).
l~.J.S. VI, 1 37 Spring, 1970
A. Components of a Frame of Reference
In the most general terms, a theory can be thought of as a series of inter-
related propositions that serve (among other things) to explain and understand
not only past and current empirical phenomena, but also to order and predict
future endeavors in scienceo The goal of theory is to maximize rationality
to the broadest range of experience--to allmv science to obtain its more commonly
recognized goals of description, prediction, explanation, control, and the like.
Behind such systematic, interrelated propositions (of whatever generality) is
a theoretical frame of reference. 2
To derive an adequate theory (in a minimal sense) one must consider three
sets of problems that are logically a priori to a theory---(l) Formulation of a
theoretical domain. This is a statement of the even t Is ) , the und t Cs) to whf.ch
rhe theory addresses itself; thus sociologists speak. of dyads, small groups,
communities, bureaucracies, Lns t Lt utLons , society, population, etc. (2) A
statement of the problem(s) to be explained--specification of the effect variables
that the theory seeks to account for. (3) Propositions further specifying
the set of explanatory variables by which one accounts for (or at least believes
t h at one can) the effect variables ~ t hen one must set forth t he relations
between the explanatory and effect variables. Cutting across the formulation
of these three problem sets are t.he problems involved in stating and defining
the property concepts and consequently the variables actually studied. This
involves development of a terminology or notation that allm7s for clear expression
of the·main theoretical ideas; i.e., terms and definitions. Finally there is
a category of statements which~ while not logically presupposed, are in
practice usually presupposed for any relatively complex theoretical formulation.
'I'hese are s trategy rule~--guiding premises "whd ch cons ti tute simplifying
assumptions about the domain which guide the development of theoretical
propositions. if 3
B. Problems of Conceptual Analysis: Property-Concepts
Discussions on methodology usually concentrate directly on this area of
concern--the question of relating theory and methodology. ~onceptual validation
requires justification of the formulation of units of interest (what the
concepts "appLy t o") , and selected properti~s of concepts: and justification of
the appropriateness of the research methods proposed to investigate those
properties that have been conceptualized C'operat t onaLi.at.ng" the ideas). In
short, any concept has a I theoretical Lmp or t " and an '. empirical import. il
The theoretical import of a concept concerns its membership as part of a
system of correlated "p r oper t Les" to whLch it is related either as cause, or
effect, or b ot.h , Its usefulness is not its own unique presentation per se,
but its Lncorporcc Lon into a verified theory whi ch systematically specifies
its relationship \1it11 other relevant properties. We clearly desire "theo re td cal,
integration~' ..... The empirical import of a concept delineates three problem-sets:
(1) operationality; (2) internal consistency between measures; and (3) external
independence from other operations. Our first problem (the "operatLonal, import"
of a concept) is the claim that certain methods of observation can be
derived t.hr ough whi.ch objects (in the broadest sense of that word) can be
classified in terms of the designated property. IImJever, such operationalism
should not be assumed to be a 1-1 relationship bet~leen the theoretical definition
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and the observation of an empirical property. On the· contrary, theoretical
definitions usually imply that 2 or more such operational procedures can be
developed--each of which can be utilized independently of the others. As such,
one has an "operatLona l. set, n wh Lch leads us to the second problem.
The internal consistency of empirical observations requires that the various
possible operations included in an operational set will yield comparable results;
for example~ two alternative measures should change together in the same way over
time. Note, however, that (1) such sets comprise a finite number of possible
measurements and (2) not all possible measurements are equally relevant--there
can be a "bes t ~i choice. Finally, the external independence of a concept is the
claim that operations not implied by the operation set will not consistently
correlate with those measures ~vithin the operation set. This is not to confuse
correlations involving causal connections, but rather this is a problem of "purI ty , II
of "noncontarmnatLon , '.~
Justification of the t11eoretical import of our concepts hinges on the "s t ate
of the union'; of sociological theory; as a minimum, it should not be inconsistent
l'lith other relevant theories, and for h Lgh levels of validity, a theory should
provide a substantive rationale--loosely put, it should "make sense. '~I Justification
of the empirical import involves mucll of the kind of work generally called
measurement--the formation of scalar properties (nominal, ordinal, etc.),
statement of a "unLt of measurement;" (rare in social science), actually studying
the uniformity of correlations between the procedures implied within the operation
set, and so on (Hart eL calls these validation problems the "formal, Import;" of
a concept).
The discussion so far no doubt seems rather abstract and the reader might
well \vonder how this relates to what is the topic at hand. The relevance will
now become clear. As mentioned earlier, this paper requires a comparative
analysis of (in this case) two theorists. To do this one must first, clarify
the significance of conflict for each respective writer and secondly, compare
the results. Hhat we want to know and establish is the import of the concept of
conflict for them. It is precisely in terms of these series of problems of theory
construction and empirical verification given above that we shall investigate
the topic. l'fuat is the theoretical import of conflict for Durkheim and Weber?
The empirical import? Within the latter, how do they handle it operationally?
Internal consistency? External consistency? In what T.:lay Ls the "formal, tmpor t"
of the property concept conflict carried out? vfuat are the units? Scaling
properties (dichotomous, ordered, ranked, etc.)? Uniformity of correlations?
Most of our attention will be on the empirical import because of the lack of
sufficiently developed theories in sociology that would allow an evaluation4ofthe theoretical import--even in such classic ~~riters as Durkheim and Weber.
~1oreover, the general discussion of a frame of reference provides criteria
that allow a comparison. That is, to ask about the comparability of 010 (or more)
theories is only meaningful in so far as there is a commonality in (1) the
domains (tihe "und t.s" of analysis); (2) rhe effect variables (what the problem(s)
is (are); and (3) the causal variables. To what "una t s" does conflict apply
to in Durkhe im and ~··7eber? Is conflict used as the point of departure (what
is to be explained) or is it used as an effect variable. to explain something
else? In short, how is the idea of conflict used in the theoretical works of
Durkheim and Weber? If such use exists, is i~comparable one? Put concisely,
~lartel's work supplies the criteria for the analysis of and comparison of theories.
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One last warning before getting into the substantive content of this
paper. The interest here is only in what role conflict plays in the wrLte rs
under examination. As such this paper is not concerned with a general
evaluation of these theories in light of rlartel is scheme. However, from
time to time statements are made that point in such a direction. There
will be no special effort at validating such general evaluations; indeed,
it is hoped that they are of such a common nature as to arouse no substantive
doubts so as to cast doubts on the results of this paper as far as the
analysis of conflict goes.
II. ilT11e Decade of the l890'sj,S
Hughes documents brilliantly the conditions "se t t Lng Up'1 the tremendous
surge in conceptual thinking in the social sciences that developed in those
years shortly before and after the turn of the century--especially in the
fields of history, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. Ilis b ook
·focuses on a virtual "rogues gallery:: Freud, Durkheim, Sorel, Croce,
Weber, Jung~ and Pareto to name a few. The general thesis (as implied in
the title) is the developing concern vlit11 "cons c'tousnes s't-e--t aken in its
broadest connotations (i.e., from Freud's unconsciousness/consciousness
motif to Durkheim' 5 it collective cons ciousness"6 ) .. I·lore explicitly, I-Iughes
delineates five "maj o r Ldeas " occurring in this period:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
A new interest in the problem of consciousness and the
role of the unconscious
The problem of irrational motivation for human conduct
A coming to terms with Marxism
The meaning of time and duration in psychology,
philosophy, literature and history
The problem of knowLedge in \'lhat Dilthey called the
"scLences of the mf.nd" (Geis t.eswf.s senschaft en) 7
A shift also developed in a basic departing point:
They had displaced the axis of social thought from the apparent
and objectively verifiable to the only partially conscious
area of unexplained motivation. In this sense the new doctrines
were manifestly subjective. 8
One is again tempted to overstate rhe case by suggesting (for sociology at
least) a shift from Durkheim's positivistic rule of treating social facts
as t'things d g to be explained only by other social facts to ~~eber9 s verstehende
Soziologie. But the point remains there was a "stir" in t.he social sciences.
Of particular relevance for this paper is the third point mentioned by
Ilughea-e--a coming to terms with ~'larx as almost a prerequisite for social
thought. \fuether one did or not is not so crucial here as the fact that
there did exist in those years a rather developed social theory very much
focusing on social conflict. Al.though it is difficult to assess the stature
of lIarx's work then (compared to now) , he was k.nown to '-Jeber and Durk.heim.
Neither could deny the existence of conflict theory.
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In addition to a coherent ·and fairly systematic body of work centering
on conflict, the actual times themselves were turbulent--the disgrace of
France in 1870-71; the Drerfus Affair, industrialization, Bismarck Germany,
and of course "]orld ~'Jar I. 0 DurkheLm and \-Jeber both involved themselves
in politics, especially during the war. They both lived in times filled
with potential and actual conflict and each, at one time or another, concerned
h Lmse Lf 't-lith the "s t ate of the union." The r e seems little doubt, then, that
abundant opportunity existed for an involvement with coriflict in their capacity
as sociologists. The question is, of course, did they so incorporate
conflict in their "tvritings? It is to this question that we nO,·1 turn.
III. Durk.heim
Very often a man's involvement in politics is related to his awareness of
conflict as a relevant variable in thinking about mana In Durkheim's case
the evidence is unfortunately mixed 0 f~Pert says that the early days of
the TIlird Republic in France provided a significant backdrop for Durkheim's
work--that he (Durkheim) was concerned with the Republican ideals of democracy
and secularism, and that positive science (in the Comte tradition) could
be a tool for attaining such ends.
In this task of socially and morally reconstituting a nation,
his nation, which had just thrown off the yoke of the Empire
but whf.ch , at the same time, suffered an ignominious and
humiliating defeat at the hands of the enemy, Emile Durkheim
was anxious to playa role. He had a mission. Now, combine
this discontent with philosophy with the desire to serve the
Republic, add a belief in the efficacy of scientific procedure,
and one is almost inevitably led to the realization of both
the necessity for, and the important function of, a science
of social phenomena. 11
Nisbet and Coser call him a conservative--a political stance that directly
affected his sociology. 12 On the Dreyfus Affair, Peyre ~-lrites that
Durkheim "must; have been profoundly moved by the venomous partisanship . 13
of that civil war" but that he "hardLy took notice of it in his wr Lt Lngs . II
In contrast, Alpert notes:
We regret not having more information about Durkheim1s part
in the Dreyfus Case. He was among the unsung heroes of that
dramatic struggle for justice and liberty. He exerted himself
unstintingly for the liberal cause. See Kayser, J., The
Dreyfus Affair ... p. 183 ·where Durkheimfs name appears among the
volunteers in the 9Army of Justice. '14
Ilowever , all agree that v7ith the advent of t~orld ~']ar I, Durkhe Im gave hLs
services tm~ards writing nationalist tracts blaming Germany for instigating
the war , l'linimally, then, Durkheim was not ignorant of political affairs
which exhibited conflict. But what about his actual work?
On the basis of previous readine of Durkheim, v7e decided to restrict
the attention of this paper to three of his four major studies: The Division
of Labor in Society, The Rules of Sociological I;lethod, and Suicide. His work
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on religion was omitted because this represented a shift in attention to the
realm of sociology of knowledge, philosophy of knowledge, and the moral
basis of societal integration founded in religion (this concern wLth "mor aLs"
permeates all his studies and the others are sufficient to handle this
point for tl1is paper; of course if this were a "gener al,: evaluation, the
shift in explanatory variables for solidarity from the division of labor
to religion is obviously important). Tge latter study constitutes the
"idealist shift d mentioned ,by Parsons. 1
The s t udy of conflict through DurkbeIm is an extremely backhanded T.,vay
of approaching the problem, for the effect variable dominating Durkheim's
wo rk is that of order in society (and groups "tvithin society). In this
respect this writer is mildly pleased to find one source of agreement
between two othenlise divergent sociologists--Parsons and Coser.
It can be said, I think., that it 1;'11as the problem of t he inte-
gration of the social system, of what holds societies together, 6
which was the most persistent preoccupation of Durkheim's career. l
TIle problem of order preoccupied DurkheLm from his earliest
writings to the last pages of the In~roduction ~ la mo~ale, a paper
he wrote shortly before his death. Directly or indirectly, all of
his writings are related to this problem. 17
The operning pages of his first major work openly expresses the concern
"tvith wha.t he called the "mo ral order ":
For it is impossible for men to live togehter, associating
in industry, lvithout acquiring a sentiment of t he whoLe formed
by their union, without attaching themselves to that whole,
preoccupying themselves with its interests, and tm~ing
account of it in their conduct .. aThis subordination of
particular interests to the general interest is, indeed,
the source of all moral activity.18
This book is pre·-eminently an at tempt to treat tile facts of the
moral life according to the method of the positive sciences. l 9
Simply put, Hi,s unit is society (though he does discuss groups ~vithin
s cci.e ty ) : his effect variable is "s oLfdard ty " or order; and his causal
. variable is the division of labor (and shi~ts to religion as a collective
representation of society).20 Thus in his major statement on methodology,
the actual domain of (presumably all) sociology per se is that of order
(iiconstraintil) :
Here, then, is a category of facts with very distinctive char-
acteristics: it consists of ways of acting, thinking, and
feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a
power of coercion, by reason of whi ch they control him. 21
The meaning of constraint also shifts throughout his writing,22 but our
purpose does not concern an exposition of Durkheim in general, but only
with reference to conflict .
There are two routes to conflict in DurkheLm ideas; namely, his
discussion of "p athoLogy" and, of course, his idea on anomie. Book Three
of his Ph i D.. dissertation concerns "abnormal forms ;li i.e., cases in which
the increasing division of labor does not lead to increased organic
solidarity. lIe mentions five examples of the "anomie" divison of labor ~
(1) commercial crises as indexed by the number of business failures
(No t.e : the first suggestion as to a measure of I:anomy':); (2) conflict
between labor and capital (the only place I have found the term conflict
used)--in so far as industrial functions become more specialized, conflict
becomes more likely: and (3) science--as a specialization of tasks increases,
the unity of science is lost because no one can master all the ~ciences
for an "overvf.ew . if The reason why these pathological forms occur are
first, lack of contact and duration of contact beo~een the organs (a
"communf.catdons-ct Lme" factor); and secondly, the worker is so isolated that
he cannot see enough of the "tot a l picture" to understand what significance
his actions have beyond themselves. 23 The other two examples are (4) class-
wars due to a lack of ~1fitll between one's ass i.gned task. and one's abilities
(this is the most direct reference to "cLass ") and (5) conditions such that
the work assigned is "not; only not considerable, but even Lnsuf ff.c.Lent "
resulting in faulty solidarity~ i.e., the workers 1 activities are
"dLs contLnuous " and canno t "adj us t t hemseLves exactly to one another and
move in concert .. 1124 If these pathological cases do, in some sense, fall
under the rubric of conflict, rhen conflict operates as an effect variable--
a "p rob Lem" in p athoLogy to be explained (a1;vay?).
He develops more abstractly the idea of pathology in his methodological
work; although confusion exists at this level. In the Division ... af La~or
pathological phenomena depart from a kind of average or modal behavior--
in the Rules, this is changed. lve can approach t he problem only through
Durk.heim's account of "norma.Lcy ; ~\ i.e., pathological presumably is the
obverse of normal. Consider the follmving~
'*Ie shall call "normal," these social conditions that are most
generally distributed, and the others "morbLd" or "pat.ho.LogLc a L. fI
If we designate as ;;average type" that hypothetical being that
is constructed by assembling in the same individual, the most
frequent forms, one may say that the normal type emerges
with the average type~ and that every deviation from this
standard of health is a morbid phenomenon. 25
This implies a statistical frequency criterion; i.e., if behavior X is "average "
thoughout a given unit A, presumably X exemplifies "normal," behavior. But
note rhe shLf t :
A social fact is normal, in relation to a given social type
at a given phase of its development, ~vhen it is present in the
average society of that species at the corresponding phase
of its evolution. 26
As an example Durkheim says (it's one of his classic statements) crime is
"normal," because it:
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is present not only in the majority of societies on one par-
ticular species, but in all societies of all types. There
is no society that is not confronted with the problem of
criminality ... There is, then, no phenomenon that presents more
indisputably all the symptoms of normality~ since it appears
closely connected ~-1ith the condi tions of collective life. 27
This analysis is not based on an "average " l'lithin one society, but is
a simple dichotomous attribute (present/absent) counted over several
societies: i.eo, crime is present in all societies, hence crime is normal.
This is not saying that the average behavior of societal members can be
described as "crimfnal," (indeed, Durkheim speaks of crime up to a given
level). Our question here is how does one make observations establishing
normal/pathological events? A simple count of present/absent? Deviation
from a "mean"? Durkheim himself worked wLth laws as a measure of
integration and a r~£lection of shifts from mechanical to organic
solidarity, but he did not "count;" them. Horeover , note that the term
pathological carries negative connotations-··-it is stated negatively as a
departure from the normal. Even assuming that his discourse on pathology
does, as a matter of fact) provide us with that part of his theoretical
sociology "concerned" with conflict, clearly conflict does not carry the
kinds of "pos LtLve " attributes that Coser finds in Simmel. 28
Finally, in the most empirical effort in Su~cide, Durkheim visualizes
suicide rates as a reflection of underlying degrees of integration
characterizing groups. (One is tempted to comment that since suicide
occurs in all the societies DurkheLm examined, suicide is -.inormal.:' True
the rates may vary, but -why should variation in rates invalidate the fact
tih at its occurrence is uniform? Yet surely the anomie suicide is a
t1 pa t h o l ogi cal U condition for Durkheim; he thought so.) If thereis any
element of Durkheim's scheme concerning conflict, anomic suicide--and the
concept of anomie--fits the bill. Anomie arises-under conditions in which
normlessness or .Ide-regulation': occurs-o-t.he abrupt loss of regulations
that provide the necessary constraints to man is insatiable "p assLons . \i
Indeed, anomie has s Lnce been used to "expLafn" "devf.an t behavior"--crime,
delinquency, alcoholism, addiction, and the like. 29 Durkheim himself
applied anomie to only three cases: (1) suicides due to economic crisis;30
(2) suicides occurring at the crisis of wLdowhood ("domestic anomyfl); and
(3) suicides of divorced people (l1con j ugal sUicideVl ) . 31
The reader should note that no where does Durkheim actually measure
anomie or investigate its own empirical properties. His argument is that
suicides during economic crises, by widows, or among divorcees are to be
classified as anomie suicides--this is assignment by definition vis a vis
the meaning of the concept anomie; there is no independent assessment of
anomie such that it is found more often amon~~idows, etc. Anomie itself
is a concept that serves as an intervening variable-- as a causal
variable to explain the differential suicide rates in these groups compared
to others. Anomie suicide cannot be nor does Durkheim propose it as a
direct measure of anomie. For him to have done so, would have resulted
in a tautology: suicides of widows are anomic~ what do I mean by anomie?
110y7 do I measure i-t? Suicides of wi.dows . \'Jhy? Because suicides of 1;17ido~'1s
are anomie. Suicide is an ex post facto analysis--what he proposes is:
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for groups (units), to explain suicide rates (effect variable), one must
consider the degree of integration (or the obverse, the degree of anomie)
(causal variable). However Durkheim does not discuss conceptual properties
of anomie in terms of our analytic scheme of empirical import and formal
import, problems of ~easuring, scaling, etc.
The entire "mood" of Durl<.heim' s work ~lith pathology and anomie is a
negative one in the sense of a direction away from the healthy, the normal,
or integration. His pessimis~ on man's inability to control his passions
without their control and limitation by society calls to mind the kinds of
tensions Freud felt. be tween man's instincts and li ci v i l i za t i on . n32 Yet while
Freud's tension almost literally snaps and sparks like a broken high
tension cable, Durkheimis potential tension fades into background because of
his smothering concern with solidarity, self-restraint, and self-control. 33
vfuat, then, does one learn about conflict in the three major works we
have examined? Frankly, very little. To examine conflict in Durkheim
requires the use of sharp, reverse English. Clearly his dominant theoretical
concerns focus on the Ilobbesian problem of order--of solidarity, of constraint,
of morals, of collective consciousness. Hhile the increasin~ division of
labor creates more segmental roles, under "normaL" conditions this division
also brings ",,,itl1 it its own style of Lntegr atLon-o-organt,c solidarity. As
the state enlarges beyond the Vie1\'7 of workers , DurkheLm suggests the
creation of occupational guilds to intercede on behalf of workers (little
dreaming they would in turn engulf workers)--the pluralism of de Tocqueville.
One comes away from Durkheim with the glue of society clogging the eyes.
In short--Durkheim does not concern himself 'ttrith conflict per se--it operates
as a backdrop, a residue category of what happens in the absence of
control, the absence of normative integration. His attention is drawn to
pathology and anomie as more or less threats to society, as serious problems
that should be overcome (at the end of his life, he was particularly
pessimistic about the "heaLth" of socfety-i--he did not use these wor ds to express
this feeling). No class conflicts, political coercion, religious wars,
racial tensions, or conflicting interest groups exist in Durkheim's pages.
As Coser says, the "Lnves t Lgator of such modern social movements as communism,
for example, finds so little aid in Durkheim's socio!ogy.!;34 One need only
consider the meaning of conflict for ~Iarx to realize the relative silence
of Durkheim.
In terms of the components of a frame of reference and conceptual
analysis given above, most of the problems raised are "empty cel.Ls " for
Durkheim with respect to conflict. His closest variable is anomie, but he
omits most of the "empLr Lcal, import problems: 35 tiheo re t Lcal.Ly it applies to
groups (units) and is an explanatory variable for the effect of suicide. 6
As such Durkheim decreed his attention elsewhere to the problem of order. 3
IV. lveber
lveber 1 s work will be easier for our purposes as he does address himself
directly to conflict per see The reader is again reminded that no attempt
vlill be made to concern outselves l,Jith the overall import of his work , Our
concern is solely with the role conflict plays.
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The general themes in v.Jeber Y s life are fairly well known in English
sources~37 His childhood occurred in a home environment permeated with
discussions of political issues and visitations by prominent politicians of
the day. His father was an active politician in Berlin and eventually a
member of the l1eichs tag. l··Jeber demanded "va.Lue-Eree" sociology, but he
could hardly be described as "vaLue-Less" in his own political conduct and
activities outside the classroom. 38 Without much doubt, one can be sure
that ~~leber was personally involved wLth "con f l.Lc t 0 If That he was acquainted
~vith t he works of Ilarx and Freud showed a familiarity ~vith the relevance
of conflict in those respective treatments.
But hO~7 does l·7eber use "confl.Lct;"? In hd s rnagnus opus, laJirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, there are only four references to Kampf (conflict)~-~f \lhich
only one is significant. 39 "Con f LLct should be called a social relationship
insofar as action is oriented towards the intention or asserting one's vlill
against the opposition of a par tne r or partners. 40 ~'Jeber procedes in t hese
few pages to briefly outline the possible ranges of conflict (bloodshed
to medieval chivalry to sports to lovers) and the distinctions to be made
between "peace f uL conflict': (competition), rivalry) and "seLect Lon" (latent
conflict). He points out that not all processes of social selection are
cases of conflict; but only those selective events involving at least
competition. This concern \vi th '·selection i ? becomes clearer trhen one realizes
that 1~eber wants to distinguish between social and/or biological "se.Lec t Lon , II
and the selection due to the fact that "al.L changes of natural and. social
condf.tLons " have some k.Lnd of influence on "t.he differential probabilities
of survival of social relationships. Ii r'Iere survival of relationships is
not enough to call thf,s "survfval of t.he fit test. U Conflict and competition
as social relationships involve subjective meanings and orientations of
people t oward the relationship at hand; i. e . , t he ends-means problem.
Thus for ~~eber, conflict involves a property relationship between two (or
more) individuals or parties (as units). It comprises a continuum ranging
from open bloodshed to peaceful competition to latency (llselection'i); what
are the "df.mens Lona" of this continuum? Presumably such elements as con-
sciousness) the meanings assigned to the relationship, and the saliency of
the goals (intent) and means deemed usable. Weber particularly investigates
the use of physical violence and coercion as a "rypa" in its own right in his
work on the state, economy, law, and his well known types of domination and
legitimacy. His work on political sociology lvill capture most of our·
attention, but one "p reLfnrlnary" question first. How pervasive is conflict
to Weber? Or, what kind of conflict is more pervasive? Clearly not the
tlarxian variety of inevitable, class we l.fare (revolution and physical violence).
It is only in the sense of "seLectLon ' that it seems, according
to our experience, that conflict is empirically inevitable, and
it is furthermore only in the sense of bj.~logical selection that
it is inevitable in principle--even on the utopian assumption
that all competitions were comple tely eliminated, cop~itions
would still lead to a latent process of selection... ~
This neutral process of selection is universal, followed with hi~l probabilities
of competition and then conflict. While Weber does not discount the potency
of conflict, neither does he take a l·larxist vie"tv on the matter.
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One of the most uniform motifs throughout \'leber v s work is that of
ratjonality--the increasing rationalization of music, religion, economy,
law, urbanization, the state, bureaucratic organization, and authority
structures. In carrying out these studies Weber acknowledges conflict
(not the violent kind, but one guided by agreed upon rules). His studies
on religion reveal the relationships between religious ideology and different
social strata and the tendency of one strata to dominate the formulation of
religious beliefs, practices) etc. Class is defined along several dimensions
concerned 't·lit11 t.he probabilities of dominance in the economic market,
dominance in power, and life styles. Power becomes the probability that A
can achieve hf,s will regardless of B' s wishes (note t'his is close to l~eber 1 s
definition of conflict); and authority is the probability that B "Iill
obey A. This opens the door to the bases of legitimacy and to his well
known "types ", 'I'hLs in no way sufficiently treats ~~le'ber' s political
sociology--but we can see that l'leber tolerated considerable opportunities for
what Coser says when pointing out "struggle, conflict and contention are in
the very center of social life" for \veber. 42
Though ~'Jeber rarely uses the term conflict, he does talk, about "s t ruggLes
for powe r" and "comp etd t Lon , rr Thus the shift from a charismatic to a
rational basis for legitimacy centers on questions of succession to power
and hence power relations and interest group competition. Hc reover , each
type of legitimacy has its own particular type of struggles for power.
For example, in the most "zecen t" type of organization--the bureaucracy--
political struggle sometimes shifts its base to the day to day exercise of
authority in the hands of bureaucrats. New roles emerge (the man who lives
, "off" politics vs , the man who lives "on" politics) ~ his discussion of the
way separate power groups emerged from the feudal ages to press continually
on the powers of the king until parliments, government bureaus, etc. developed
illustrates Weber's superb analytical ability.43
The theoretical import of conflict for Weber seems clear--he uses it
in the analysis of party struggles in politics, intra-bureaucratic "fLghtdrig , fa
religious dominance of a given ideological expression, problems of succession
in different and mixed authority systems, and as a background for, say, the
development of cities. Conflict is a property relationship applicable to
different units and to different problems. Conflict per se is not Weber's
concern, but is of interest chiefly for its part in the larger process of
rationality and secularization he saw as characteristic of his (and the
future as well) times; we should 'remember that his major studies are
historical tracts. tloreover we feel Weber tends to treat conflict as an effect
variable (a "p rob Lem") r ather than a causal or explanatory variable. For
example, for each type of domination, l.Jeber delineates the "recurren t issues
that characterize tile struggle for power , Y1 l~eber asks wha t the consequences
are for power relationships in different types of legitimacy patterns; he
addresses a problem of conflict'and seeks an account thereof.
The weakest treatment of conflict in Weber concerns the empirical import
of this idea. Nowhere does he present 2EY empirical measure--nor does he
suggest any. Nowhere can we find how to conclude that system A has a higher
degree of conflict than system B (higher degree in the sense of intensity;
i.e., not bullets versus ballots). Weber's discussions are couched in a
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style of . reasonablene~s" in most of his works) whf.ch probably reflects his
verstehende strategy. 4 '·.Jirtschaft und Gesellschaft contains no tables)
statistics, etc. Not that he was a "s t ranger " to statistical studies, 45
rather he utilizes historical case studies and documents. As mentioned
above, he has empirical implications for the concept of conflict as a
multidimensional variable--but he no where begins the kind of analysis
required by our "mode L" for empirical analysis discussed previously. '~eber's
greatest significance is the system of theoretical concepts and methodological
strategies he developed--we assert this in spite of his fame for his
actual studies on religion, cities, law, and the like. Primarily because
we continue today to utilize his ideas (the best example is bureaucracy),
though his empirical findings may be modified.
In spite of the above characterization of l'Jeber, some doubt exists in
our mind as to the broader significance of conflict in Weberis work. We noted
earlier only one reference to the term in his magnum opus; even Bendix
feels it unnecessary to list conflict in his book 011 t~eber. The is sue i.s
not "words " but "concep t s ; it however , this is a notable absence in a man
claimed as a member of ,t11e conflict stream in sociological theory. l']e
associate class and power struggle in ~veber, but to the extent these become
routinized and regulated, they become competition and not conflict--there's
a de-escalationunheard of, say, i11 Harx (except for the last big clash).
t'Jeber never involved himself ~'litll open conflicts like wars (he was more
interested in the routinization of the military). ResponsLbLl.Lty for
phys Lcal, violence was relegated to the state, and giv~ that, loJeber becomes
more interested in. the rationalization and secularization, bureaucratization,
etc. within society (religion, economy, cities, music, and law). As with
Durkheim, Weber has no consideration for conflict as 11arx had--conflict is
an ever present phenomenon~ but is not in any sense of the word a key element
for Weber. 46
v. Comparison and Conclusions
The comments above already imply comparisons between Durkheim and
'veber that are not too difficult to see. In general Durkheim ignored direct
confrontation with conflict; where touched upon lightly (labor-capital,
widows, etc.) his domain encompasses groups. This clearly overlaps Weber's
studies on inter-group (units) competition in religiotls, economic, and
political contexts. Durkheim does not study as rich an assortment of groups
as l·Jeber (his \.]idest range of groupS:-really "co.lLec t.Lvt t Les ," is in the
Suicide study). Both vf.ew conflict as a problem-···for Durkhe Lm it is a
pathological one, a departure from the normal, whf.Le for Ueber conflict
(better--competi tion or struggle) comprises expec t ed kLnds of phenomena ;
i.eo, were "normal.;" It is our position, though, that neither gives
conflict the kind of "s t atus ': it has in a Harx i an treatment. To the degree
that anomie exe~plifies a type of conflict and possesses its own properties,
one may say t ha t Durk.heim uses conflict here as a causal variable to explain
the anomie type of suicide (recall the difficulties of avoiding a tautology
here and remember that he did not investigate the empirical properties of
anomie per se). ---
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Both are weak in terms of the empirical import of the concept. Neither
develops an operation set, internal validity, or external validity for
conflict as a variable property; neither measures conflict directly; neither
attempts scaling or other measurement investigations into the empirical
characteristics of conflict; neither can evaluate the theoretical import
of conflict--what other conflict theory exists to serve as a measuring rod?
In short, though conflict is more salient to \veber' s work than to
Durkheim's, it remains in a primitive state of development as judged by
the criteria set forth in Part I of this papero
The general cone.IusLon of this paper points out the many "empty cel.l.s"
in the discussion of conflict in the theorists examined. To the extent
that this is more characteristic than not of sociological theory, it
illustrates what is meant by our earlier statement that sociology lacks
adequate theory construction. Of course this could be a reflection not of
sociological thought, but of the inapplicability and inappropriateness of
the framework developed by which we m&~e such a judgment. We feel
differently--it is the precise virtue of this analytical scheme for theory
(and empirical import) in pointing out the empty cells--it provides us with
a direction for organizing research efforts--it allows us to estimate some
sense of progress in the buildins up of analysis over time. That the
requirements for adequate theory formulation are hard constitutes no
reason for denying our lack of knowledge. The application of this framework
to other theories on conflict or the use of conflict by other writers
allows comparative judgments that assess ~qhere we stand with respect to
this concept. i-Ioreover, the possibility of synthesis can be analyzed using
this framework. The substantive analysis of conflict in Durkheim and
Weber illustrates the kind of awareness we need.
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1. For a brief listing and note on contemporaries of Durkheim and
1\Teber, see Reinhard Bendix, i-lax 1Veber: An Intellectual Portrait
(G-arden City, New York, 196Z;;-lJP. 470-73:":- A shcrf note on this
is contained below.
2. TIle di.scuss ion that follows is based upon lecture notes and
unpubLi.shed sources by 1·1artin U. ilarte l.: "On 'the Proper Care and
Feeding of Sociological Property- Concepts: A' Life Cycle I Approach
to Conceptual Validity" (Presented at the Annual, .Ieet ings of the
AInerican Sociological Association in New York City, August 1960;
mimeographed, pp , 1- 23); "Supplement #1: Some Vi.gnettes-on Scientific
Theory" (mimeographed, pp. 1-12); "SuppLemerrt #2: Some' Notes on
Axiomatic Sys tems and The i r Applications to Sociological Theori.es"
(mimeographed, pp. 1-12); "Supplemerrt #3.1: Anal.ys i s of Theoret i.cal.
Arguments Incomplete Not.ational. Sys tem and Syntax (I Desperanto ' )"
(mimeographed, pp. 1-6); and "Sci.ence and Social Sc.ience" (mimeo-
graphed, pp. I-IS). For a publ i.shed study ut i l i.z inc .Iartel ' s
ideas see Kent P. Schwi.r i.an and John 1\[. Frelm, "An Axiomatic Theory
of Urbanization, It A1nerican Sociological Review, December 1962,
27:812-25.
3. For an example of rhi.s concept see ilart.in u. r lar'tel , "Some
Controversial Assumptions in Parsons' Theory of Social Systems, i i
Alpha Kappa Deltan, Winter 1960, pp. 53-63.
4. One example of theoreticat inadequacy can be seen in tile
sociological discussions concerned wi 'th the 1 'synthesist' between
functionali sm and conflict theory. Another is t.hi.s paper- - to anticipate
the results, there are so many "empty 'cells" in investigating
conflict in Durldleim (especially) and Weber as to illustrate '~lat
I mean by "gaps". To anticipate further , rhe conclusions (largely
negative in the sense of "not relevant") for Durkheim lie simply
in the realm of effect variables; i. e., he was not concerned \vitil
the probLem of conflict per sev- -he 'vas concerned wi.th "crder ;':
but conflict can be unders tood in Durkheim only ill a backhanded way;
the conclus ions for \\Teber are not like thi.s , for he is cIaimed
as a "conf'l i.ct theori.st' (at least, in part).
5 . Thi.s comes From I-I. Stuart i lughes , Consciouslless and Society:
The Reorientation of European Social TllQUgllt, 1890-1930 (New York,
"I9bl), ell. 2 :'Tlle Decade of the 1890's: TIle RevoLt Against
Positivism," pp. 33-66.
6. Hughes does not put it quite thi.s way; bes ides there is a host
of confusions in s tating Freud' 5 consciousness and Durkhe im' s collective
consciousness in the same breath. I~or S110uld tfu.s use of Durkhe.im ' s
tenn imply a "group mi.nd" fallacy. (Parsons has pointed out quite
well the clifficulty behind rhi.s evaluation of DurkileiIn: 11To the
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FOOTNOTES COr~TlNUED
great Inajority of sociologists Dur~le~ is still cited as the
leading 1101der of 'the 'unsound' "group-mind.' 'theory. It would be
difficult to discover a more striking example of 'the way in whi.ch
preconceived conceptual scll~nes can prevent the dissemination of
important Ideas ," rrlle Structure of Social Action (i\Je\'i York , 1961),
p. 463. 'I'he statement was originally made in 1937.) Rather it
is meant only as the character-ization of a "mood" in social theory.
7• Huglles , . op. cit .
8. Ibid., p. 66.
9. 1\ gross overstatement because, for one 'tlring , Durkhe im shifted
hi.s grounds : " ... from being the most positivistically minded of
the protagonists of thi.s study, Durkheim gradually evolved 'toward
a standpoint that was idealist in all but name." Parsons, op , cit.,
.p. 278. lV11etller one agrees the shi.ft was as strong as Parsons says,
the tone of Durkheim r S 5 tudy of religion is quite different from 'the
"hardness" of the study of suicide.
10. For a most readable and perhaps too colorful account of Europe
f rom 1890 to 1914, see Barbara \'J. 'luchman , TIle Proud' Tower : A
Portrait of the \'iorld Before the lVar: 189.0-=1914 (New York, 1967),
especiallyCl~4 "'Give me Cornbat-r'France: 1894-99," pp, 195-263
and ell. 6 "'l~eroism Is In fhe Air' Germany: 1890-]914," pp. 339-407.
11. Harry Alpert, Emile Durl<heim and lIis Sociology (New York,
1939), p. 30.
12 . Robert Ni.sbet , •'Conservatism and Sociology, 1'1 American Joui7Ia9-1 of
'Sociology, 1954, 58:167-75 and Lewis A. Coser , "Durl<lleim's Conservatism
and its Implications for h is Sociological Theory, I' in Emile Durkheim,
et. al., Essays .Q!!. Sociology and PllilosopllY (l'·Je\~J York, 1966), pp.
211-32.
13. llenri Peyre, "Durkheim: TIle ilan , lIis Time, and Hi.s Intellectual
Background," in Durkhe im, et. al., op, cit , , p. 6. Peyre remasks later
in Iris essay on Durkheim ' sreactionto attacks on 'the Sorbonne
growing out of tile Dreyfus case that "Durkheim could not burden his
life wi.th idle po lemi.cs ;" Ibid., p. 15.
14. Alpert, 2£, cit., p. 60, footnote 89.
15. i-lelviri Ri.clrter does cite p. 78 of a 1950 French edi.tion of
ProfessioIlal Ethics and Civic ~,Iorals to suggest that Durkhe im
did find a positive function for conflict; however , 11e continues
and notes 'that Durkheim "never again 'took up those Lnsi.glrts he had
gained through hi.s political thouglit ; that is, that conf'Li.ct; may on
occasion serve positive ends ... " See ivIelvin Ri.chtner , "Durkheims
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Politics and Political Theory ," in Durkheim, et. al., Ope cit., pp.
194 ·and 203. Thi.s is the only reference I have found suggesting· ' ...
any kind of "pos i.tive" function of conflict for Durkhe.im. For an
analysis that does focus on Durkheiru' s works not covered in thi.s paper,
see Irving 1.1. Zeitlin, Ideology aJld tile Development of Sociological
Tlleory (New Jersey, 1968), 01. 15, "Enlile DurJrJleiJn,' f pp. 234~80,
especially hi.s discussions on Durkheim and conflict pp. 237, 241,
245, 246 J 247, 248, 256, 262, 265, and 275. Tl1is paper was ,vritten
before h i.s book was available, but Zeitlin' 5 analysis of Durkheim
supports the discussion here 0
16. Talcott Parsons, "Durkheim' s 'Contribution' to tIle Theory of
Integration of Social Systems," i11 Durkheim , et . al . , op. cit., p. 118.
17 . Coser, ~, cit 0 , p . 213. Thi.s paper and Zeitlin's chapter (see
footnote 15) are rhe B10St detailed in stating 110\V Durkheirn failed
to consider conflict in 11:LS work.
18. Emile Durkheim , TIle Division of Labor in Society '(Illinois,
1960), p. 14.
19. Ibiel., p. 32. In hi.s thes i s defense of this study, he was
accused of wri, ting a tract on ethi.cs , not science, but Durkhe im
fielded these and other "attacks" wi.thout mich di.fficulty. See
Alpert, ~. cit., pp. 45-46.
20. For a detailed secondary analysis of such shi.f'ts in Durkheim' 5
t.hought.s , see Parsons, TIle Structure of Social Action" op , cit.,
ellS. 8-11, pp. 301-450.- - - -
21. Ernile Durkheirn , TIle Rules of Sociological IIetllod· (Illinois,
1962), p. 3.
22. Parsons, Ope cit., 01. 10, pp. 376-408, especially pp. 378-90.
23. Durkhe im , TIle Division of Labor in Soci.ety, op , ci.t . , pp. 353-73.
24. Ibid., pp. 374-88 and 392-93. This is the only hint of class
as a differentiating factor found in ele book.
25. Durkheim , TIle Rules of Sociological ~'·.lethod, Ope cit., pp. 55-56.
26. Ib i.d.. , p. 64. TIle original is in italics.
27. Ibid; , pp. 65-66. lie continues to .remark that "crime is normal
'because a society exempt from it is utterly Imposs ibLe," p. 67.
28. Lewi.s A. Coser , The FLUlctions of Social Conflict (1'Je1'" York, 1964).
See footnote 15.
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29. A thorough t.reatment of the concept of anomie is beyond the
scope of 'this paper," This author has been interested in such an
analysis and rhe t reatmerrt of anomie here is based upon two studies:
David SutherLand , '1011 rhe Not i.on of Anomie" (manuscrtpt , pp. 1-/~3)
and a more extensive and updated treatment is currently being prepared.
30. Durkheim r emarks , "111 one sphere of social life, however- <the
sphere of trade and industry--it (anrnnie) is actually in a dlronic
state. Ii Suicide (l~ew York, 1966), p. 254 (Recall hi.s earlier state-
ment in TIle Divis.ioll of Labor in Society about Labor and capital).
31. Ibid. ~ pp. 258, 259, mid 262 respectively.
320 TIle most conci.se s tut.ement of Durkhenu on the relation between
the individual and society is ill Suicide, Ope cit., pp. 246-54. Com-
pare thi.s wi.th Sigmund Freud , Civilization and its Discontents
(l'le"J York, 1961) / pp. 11-92.
33. Tl1l1S examine Durkhe.im' S comments all schools, school discipline,
and school puni.shment .in l·Ioral Education: A Study in the Theory
and Application of ~lle. Sociology-of EaUCation (Ne\v Yor~1961) ,
pp. 17-63, 95-126, and 144-206. Along these lines, I cannot think
of a more interesting contrast to Durldleim ~1an A. S. Neill,
Sununerllill: 8:. Radical_ ~T)roacll to C11ild Rearing (l~e\v York , 1961).
Further Improvement of 'tlris paper woul.d include an analysis of
Durkhe imts sociology of education; however , it is doubtful such
considerations \~ould modify our conclusions. See Zeitlin, Ope cit.,
ppo 257-60.
34. Coser, "Durkheims Conservatism and its ImpLi.cati.ons for his
Socio~ogical Thecry ," Q~. cit., p. 2230
35. Thi.s is still true toclay- -rhe only "real.' f measure is the Srole
Anornia Scale, whi.ch is a soci.al.vpsychol.ogica.I measure that, among other
things , reflects a shi f't in units from groups to rhe psychol.ogi.ca.l
perceptions of individuals~
36. For a particularly cogent statement of Durkhe.im' S shor-tcomings
in the neglect of conflict, see Coser, Ope cit., pp. 211-12. Unlike
the three works examined here , the studYon re Li.gi.on has an index.
Though we are Lnterested in the idea of conf.l i ct , not the t 'word' f_
label') there are no headi.ngs for conf.l.i.ct , competition, disequilibrium,
di.sorgani.zation , class confLi.ct , or the Li.ke , See Emile Durkheim ,
The Elementary_ Fenns_ of tll~ H.eligious Lif~ (New York , 1961),
"Index," pp. 499-507.
37. TIle Engl.i.sh sources all 1Veber .t s life are 1-1. II. Gerth and C.
\vrigllt i-Iil.Ls , itA Bi.ograplu.cal. Vi.ew ," and "Pol.i.ti.cal. Concerns," in
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FrOIn Ivlax \\Teber: Essays in Sociology (l'~ew York , 1958), pp. 3-31
.and 32-44; II.P. Secher , "Introducti.on ," in .Iax \Veber, Basic Concepts
in Sociology [Nsw York , 1962), pp. 7-23; Talcott Parsons, "TIle
Author and Hi.s Career," in l.Iax 1Veber, TIle T11eory of Social and
ECOll0TIlic Organization (New York , 1964), pp , 3-7; Kar l Jaspers,
"llax ~veber as Politician, Scientist, PhiIosopher ," 'in Leonardo,
Descartes, I·lax lVeber: Tl1ree Essays (London, 1965), pp. 187-274;
Paul Iloni.gshe.im , "llax 1'1eber: Hi s Religious and Bthi.cal Background
and Development,' I OlL1YC}1 Hi.story , December 1950, 19: 3- 23 and On
llax lVeber (New York, 1968), especially "1·,lemories of : lax lVeber7
pp. 1-112); and C. Di.ehl , "The Life and \Vorlc of l\'Iax \Veber,· r Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1924, 38: 37-107. In GenUaI1, 'the primary source
is ,of course, I·lariarnle ~Veber, ~·1~'( 1\leber: ein Lebellsbil~ (Ttfbingen ,
1926); Hax 1'~eber, Jegendbriefe CTUbirlgen, n. d.) (covers letters from
21 August 1876 to 2 September 1893); Rene' Ktlrlig and .Johannes
1vincl~elnlaTll1, eds , , "iIax '\Teber zum Gedaclrtni.s : ~ Iaterialien und
Dockumerrte zur Bewertung von 1verl< and Persbnli.chke.it, 'i KtJlner
Zeitscllrift flir Soziologie und Sozi.al.psycho.logi.e , Sonderhef't 7,
1963, pp. 5-271; and Eduard Baumgarten, llax \veber: \verl( U11d Person
(TUbingen, 1964). - ----
38. Indeed, in reading for another paper on Vleber, I learned of
a fairly stiff controversy on the nature of Weber's politics, a topic
not usually mentioned in sociological discussions of l\feber. See
J. P. llayer , i·lax 1\Teber and German Politics: A Study in l)olitical
Sociology (London, 1956) in which l\Jeber is presented as a bourgeoise
German nationalist pre-dating "the German probIem" (t}lis book is
also a runni.ng biography of \Veber) . See also 1'Jolfgang «lommsen , i.Iax
lveber and die delltsclle Poli tile (TUbingen, 1959) and '7 lax \\Teber 's-
Political Sociology and His Plii Iosophy of 'Vorld Hi.story , I' International
Social Science Journal, 1965, 17:23-45; and Jaspers, ~. cit.,
especially pp. 195-229. Thi.s issue is not a "dead one," as noted
by a brief description of the ~\Teber Centenary Conference in Hei.delberg ..
"The report and t.he dis cussion whi.ch was devoted to tile theme
'~··1~"'{ 1veber and PO'''1er Politics,' showed clearly what is meant by the
assertion 'that '''e 'lack a- detached dis tance From ! 1. 1Veber... ' j Hans
P. Bahardt , i 1'.lax lveber und die ilachtpol i tile, ,t in I·Ians }1. Bahrdt ,
et , al . , "l-lax l\Teber und die Soziologie heute : RUclcblick auf
einemICongress," Kdl.ner Zeitscllrift'- fUr Soziologie und Sozialpsydlologie,
1965, 17:793. See also I'Ierbert !'.larcuse,"IndustrlaIlzatlon and Capi-
talism," New Left Revi.ew, llarch/April, 1965, 30: 3-17 (this is an
Bngl i.sh translation of his major address at the lVeber Centenary
Conference in lle idenberg) and especially Guenther Roth , "Political
Critiques of Hax \Veber: Some Implications for Political Soci.ol.cgy ,' 1
American Sociological Review, April 1965, 30:213-23.
39. i·..lax 'veber, lVirtscilaft und Gese l l.schaft : Grundriss de r Verstehenden
Soziologie (Studlenausgabe)-TB~nde (1(8In , 1964), Zwei.ter IIalbband,
p. 117. The references are to pp. 27, 30, 66, and 490 all in Volume
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I. The only significant one is pp. 27-29 in whi.ch lveber defines
conflict as a social reIationshi.p.
40. Ibid., 1). 27. Thi,s wri.ter will not procede to translate lVeber
on hi.s own, However it is interesting to compare his t ransaeti.on
1-vith two others : Parsons : IfA social reIationslrip will be referred
to as 'conflict' in so far as action within it is oriented intentionally
to carrying out the actor's O\VIl wi.LI against the resistance of the other
party or parties." (In llax lVeber, TIle Tlleory of Social and Economic
Organization, Ope cit., p. 132. Sechl.er : irA social relationship
wi.LI be called a struggle insofar as the behavior of one part is
oriented purposefully toward making hi.s own wi l I prevail against
the resistance of other parties or another party. 1 t (In iIax l\feber,
Basic Concepts in Sociology, op. cit., p. 85). TIle problems of
translation revealed here may be more serious than one might suspect
as suggested by a remark addressed to GernlaJl sociologists: "The
assertion expressed occasionally that Germans had forgotten thei.r
classical sociology and now learned it again only through American
mediation l1as proven itself false. The number of older and also
younger sociologists who for a long time continued to read: I. 1veber
in the original, who learn from hirn and argue wi th 11iIn ~i thout making
a detour 'through Arnerican interpretations, is not small.' I Bahrdt ,
et. al., ~. cit., p. 792.
41. ~Veber, The Tlleory of Social and Economic Organization, .2£. cit.,
p. 134.
42. Coser, "Durkheims Conservatism and its Implications," ~. cit.,
p. 220.
43. One of the best overall summaries of l'ieber' s political sociology
is Bendix, 2£. cit., Part III, pp. 285-468, especially pp. 318-25,
348-60, and 431-57 for discussions on power struggles. Recent
centenary meetings on \\Teber have resulted in several special pub-
lications: "Papers .on Nax l'1eber, 11 American Sociological Review,
April 1965, 30: 171- 223; .''I'flax '\Teber lveber Today, It International Social
Science "Journal, 1965, 17~.g-70; I\Iax 'veber und die Soziologie heute ,
Verllandlungen des fUnfzehn~en deutSchen SoZIOlogenta~s (Ttibingen,
1965), papers in Sociology and Social Researdl, April 1967,51:323-60,
"llax l'leber, 1864-1964: A Sympos ium ," Sociological Quarterly,
Autumn 1964, 5:313-99, papers in Sociology and Social Research,
April 1967, 51:323-60., and I(ljnig und 1vinc}<elmann, QE., cit., pp. 273-
488. For a general bi.b l iography on l'leber see Hans Certh and
Iledwi.g Ide Certh , I 'BibLi.ography 011 lilax \'!eber," Social Research,
i.lare11 1949, 16: 70- ~9.
44. TIle study on the Protestant Ethi,c contains a table in the Ap-
pensix relating religious background and educational level. Kenneth.
Rothrock calculated a chi.vsquare (not significant), but the trouble as ,
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as Kurt Samuelson points out, the table is incorrect.
"4S. They remain largely obscure and none have been translated.
See Paul Lazarfeld and Anthony Oberschal.L, "i-iax \Veber and Empirical
Social Research, It American Sociological Review, April 1965, 30: 185-99
and the excellent study of Anthony Oberscllall, Ernpirical Social
Researdl in Germany 1848-1914 (TIle Hague , 1965), especially ell. 6
"Max lveber and the Problem of Industrial lVorl<, I J pp. 111- 36.
46. For an opposite view of tile one expressed here see Bendix,
Ope cit., pp. 262-63.
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